remembered nowadays as the author of a leading textbook on international economics (Ellsworth 1937) , although it is worth noting that he was also a very early (December 1936) but hitherto unrecognized discoverer of what came to be called the IS-LM model as a means of elucidating issues raised by Keynes's (1936) General Theory. 1 It is not known how widely this memorandum was circulated, but the fact that it is a piece of policy advocacy, combined with its relatively polished style, makes it inconceivable that it was meant for the eyes and files of its authors alone. As readers will see, it sketches out an explanation of the then rapidly developing Great Contraction, as well as a comprehensive and radical policy program for dealing with it. In keeping with its authors' explanation of the contraction as a consequence of a collapsing money supply, the main domestic components of that program were to be vigorously expansionary open-market operations and substantial deficit spending that, particularly in its early stages, was to be financed by money creation; its international dimension involved a return to free trade and serious efforts to resolve the problems of international indebtedness that had originated in the Great War and in the Treaty of Versailles that had brought it to an uneasy end in 1919.
The Memorandum's Significance
The existence of this memorandum has recently been noted in one or two publications, but apart from a brief discussion in Sandilands 2001 , its significance has not been adequately appreciated. First, it is self-evidently a coherent work of high intellectual quality and provides documentary evidence about an original and provocative element in the macroeconomic thought of an important intellectual center, namely Harvard, in the early years of the depression, before the New Deal and before the importation of the theoretical ideas of Keynes's General Theory (1936) . Second, it provides considerable insight into the early intellectual 1. The standard source of information on Currie's life is Sandilands 1990; on White, see Rees 1973 and Boughton 2001 . We are unaware of any biography of Ellsworth, but the editors tell us that some information about him is in Lampman 1993 , although no single section of that book is devoted to him. Ellsworth's (1936) exposition of a version of the IS-LM model, published when he held an appointment at the University of Cincinnati, seems to be the second to have appeared (after that of W. B. Reddaway in 1936) and antedates J. R. Hicks's (1937) exposition of the system. Warren Young (1987) does not refer to it in his now standard history of the "IS-LM-ization" of Keynesian economics. development of Currie and White, both of whom had great influence on the course of U.S. domestic and international economic policy in the years of the Roosevelt administration. The importance of a document in which these two had a hand, and which deals extensively with domestic macroeconomic policy and international economic relations, is surely obvious. It merits the attention of any historian of interwar economic thought for this reason alone.
The memorandum is also interesting for a third reason. There are strong similarities between the program it sets out and the one embodied in the recommendations sent to President Herbert Hoover over the signatures of twenty-four economists who participated in the conference on gold and monetary stabilization held under the auspices of the Norman Wait Harris Foundation at the University of Chicago on 27-31 January 1932, and published in its proceedings (Wright 1932, 161-63) . This conference took place at the end of the very month in which this memorandum was completed. Given its venue, and the fact that no fewer than twelve of the signatories of its recommendations occupied posts at the University of Chicago, the letter containing the recommendations has long been cited as one of the seminal documents of what has sometimes been claimed to be a unique "Chicago tradition" in monetary analysis. 2 But as one of us (Laidler 1993 ) has earlier noted, one of the non-Chicago economists involved in drafting the recommendations was John H. Williams of Harvard. As we shall see, the record of his oral contributions to the Harris Foundation conference suggests that he was probably familiar with the Harvard memorandum, and certainly well acquainted with some of the ideas emphasized in it. 3 These considerations constitute strong circumstantial evidence of a Harvard influence on one of the Chicago tradition's earliest documents. But even if this conjecture 2. The first mention of this Chicago tradition seems to have been by Milton Friedman (1956) , and its nature and claim to uniqueness were subsequently discussed by, among others, Don Patinkin (1969 Patinkin ( , 1973 , Thomas Humphrey (1971), and Friedman (1974) . The links, or absence thereof, of this tradition to ideas current at Harvard are debated by Laidler (1993 Laidler ( , 1998a Laidler ( , 1998b and George Tavlas (1997 Tavlas ( , 1998a . Tavlas (1998b) later restates the view that the Chicago tradition was unique. Friedman (1974) makes much of the 1932 Harris Foundation conference as an example of the Chicago tradition, and in so doing he draws on the work of J. Ronnie Davis (1968) , who also discussed it extensively. See also Davis 1971. 3. A complete transcript of the conference's deliberations (Norman Wait Harris Foundation 1932) is to be found in the Regenstein Library at the University of Chicago.
is discounted, it is clear from the following memorandum that there was nothing unique about the Chicago tradition as it stood in early 1932. 4 We shall now elaborate on these matters in turn.
Harvard Economists and the Depression
The best-known product of the Harvard economics department dealing with economic policy in the early 1930s is a collection of essays titled The Economics of the Recovery Program (D. V. Brown et al. 1934) , which the department's historian Edward Mason (1982) has tactfully characterized as "not very distinguished." We prefer to stand by the verdict of Laidler (1993 Laidler ( , 1078 , that most of the essays "verge on the incoherent and do no credit to their distinguished authors." The only intellectually coherent contribution to this collection, which offered a comprehensively negative assessment of President Roosevelt's policy plans, was that of Joseph Schumpeter. He advanced an essentially "Austrian" interpretation of the depression, locating its causes in a bout of overinvestment that had collapsed in 1929, and arguing forcefully that attempts at a cure by monetary or fiscal expansion would serve only to prolong the slump. This was also the view of another member of the Harvard department, albeit a visitor from Vienna at this time, Gottfried von Haberler, who gave it a thorough airing in a paper (Haberler 1932) presented to the very Harris Foundation conference that produced the recommendations referred to earlier, which, by the way, he did not sign. There is, then, no question that Harvard's reputation for mediocrity and policy pessimism in the early 1930s is founded in fact, but this has never been the whole story. Its economics department had until quite recently been an important center for the development of balance of payments theory under the leadership of Frank Taussig, and monetary economics, largely under the leadership of Allyn A.Young. Among Taussig's supervisees in earlier years had been Jacob Viner, Frank Graham, and John H. Williams, and among Young's, at Harvard, had been James Angell, Arthur Marget, and E. H. Chamberlin, while Currie had expected to become another. 5 Taussig was still on the Harvard faculty in the early 1930s, and still editor of the Quarterly Journal of Economics. He also remained involved with graduate students' work, supervising the thesis of Harry White, one of the authors of the memorandum; Currie was also closely enough associated with him to contribute to a collection of essays in his honor in 1936. 6 However, Taussig was by then in his seventies and, as George Tavlas (1997, 170-71) has noted, such public comments of his on the depression that survive were few and noncommittal. Young, moreover, had left Harvard in 1927 to take up a temporary appointment at the London School of Economics, from which he had expected to return in 1930, but he died of influenza in March 1929 at the early age of fifty-two.
As Perry Mehrling (1997) has argued, Young's work in monetary economics had sought a middle ground between the quantity theory of Irving Fisher and the real-bills approach of James Laurence Laughlin and Henry Parker Willis that dominated thinking at the Federal Reserve Board in the 1920s and early 1930s; and it had informed his efforts as an adviser to Benjamin Strong at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 7 Young was also a great admirer of, and was in turn admired by, Ralph Hawtrey, an official of the United Kingdom Treasury, whose only academic appointment, as a visitor to Harvard in 1928-29, Young was instrumental in arranging. 8 In common with Hawtrey, Young was a supporter of the gold standard and an advocate of discretionary monetary policy aimed at ironing out the cycle, but unlike Hawtrey, he was also an advocate of public works expenditure as a tool of stabilization policy in its own right. Young's death left a vacuum in the field of what we would now call macroeconomics among the senior ranks at Harvard that Joseph Schumpeter was soon to fill. Currie, one of the three authors of the memorandum that is the focus of this note, had been Young's student and Hawtrey's assistant during his year at Harvard. He had expected to write his Ph.D. thesis (Currie 1931 ) under Young's supervision, but it was, in fact, completed under the guidance of Williams and submitted in January 1931. This thesis is a clear antecedent of the memorandum. 9 It blended Hawtrey's monetary cycle theory with Young's empirical approach to the analysis of the U.S. monetary system, and offered (among other things) a quantity-theorybased explanation of the downturn that began in 1929, a critique of the Federal Reserve System's passive response to it, and the suggestion that a more vigorously expansionary monetary policy would have been appropriate during 1929-30. It is worth noting that the quantity theory he deployed was an income velocity version of the doctrine, such as Hawtrey and Young customarily used, rather than the Fisherian transactions velocity variant. 10 And Currie's slightly later Supply and Control of Money in the United States (1934) , dedicated to Young's memory, further developed these themes, and was (indeed still is) particularly notable for expounding the thesis that, far from having engaged in expansionary policy as it claimed at the time, the Federal Reserve System had remained largely passive as the depression gathered momentum into 1932-33. He can, then, reasonably be regarded as having largely anticipated the monetary explanation of the Great Contraction that was later developed by Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz (1963) . Only in his sometimes ambiguous discussions of the buildup of excess reserves in the banking system during 1932-33 does his analysis differ from theirs. 11 9. Currie would later suggest that Williams's role in shaping his thesis was rather minor. He remarked in a 1992 letter to Laidler that "I probably had more influence on his [Williams's] thinking than he did on mine." For further discussion of this point, which corroborates the suggestion we make below that the memorandum influenced Williams's contributions to the 1932 Harris Foundation conference, see Laidler 1993 Laidler , 1091 10. Currie's thesis in its original 1931 version contains an extensive discussion of Hawtrey's work, but this material was deleted from the draft later submitted for the Wells Prize competition at Harvard. See Laidler 1999, 234 n. 25. We speculate, without any direct evidence, that he may have done this because Haberler, one of the judges for the competition that year, was known to be hostile to Hawtrey, having, for example, explicitly and sharply criticized him in his 1932 Harris Foundation paper (Haberler 1932, 193) . Whatever the reason, however, the modification was to no avail. The prize that year was awarded to White. See Sandilands 1990 , 23. 11. Karl Brunner (1968 and Humphrey (1971) were the first to note Currie's contribution here. Frank Steindl (1995, chap. 4) defends the uniqueness of Friedman and Schwartz's interpretation, largely on the basis of his reading of Currie's discussions of the role of excess reserves. See note 16 below for further comment.
Particularly important given the joint authorship of the following memorandum, there already exists evidence that Currie did not develop these ideas in isolation. It is well known that he and White were already close friends and worked together when at Harvard (see Sandilands 1990, 23) . Furthermore, when Erik Lundberg spent time at Harvard in 1933 he found the department a center of lively debate, and he described its environment in the following terms:
Schumpeter had gathered around him a group of young economists, all working with modern monetary theories. During most of the summer I had discussions with some of them, especially on monetary questions concerning the business cycle. In Washington, and also to a large extent in New York, I had repeatedly heard of the tremendous inflation during the years leading up to 1929. At Harvard, reputed for its conservatism, I now learned that there had been no inflation, but rather the contrary. Professor [sic] Currie was the most eager advocate of this theory . . .; Currie was not alone in holding this opinion. He, as well as the others who held this belief at Harvard were good economists, as were the people with the opposite view in New York and Washington. (Lundberg [1934] 1995, 62; emphasis added) 12 Evidently Currie was no lone wolf at Harvard in the early 1930s, as Tavlas (1997) characterized him, but nor was he a professor as Lundberg had it; he was an untenured instructor.
It would be a mistake to think that divisions of opinion about macroeconomic questions at Harvard lay solely along lines demarcated by age and rank, with mediocrity and pessimism being concentrated among the department's "establishment." Although they would in due course become members of that establishment, some contributors to the Economics of the Recovery Program were, after all, young and untenured in 1934 (e.g., Wassily Leontief, Edward Chamberlin, Seymour Harris), while, as we shall see, at least one member of that establishment, John H. Williams, was quite sympathetic to proposals like those of Currie and 12. In this passage, the word inflation should be read, in accordance with the common usage of the time, as referring to the expansion of money and credit, rather than to a rise in the price level. The view that the depression was the inevitable consequence of a previous overexpansion of credit in the 1920s was held in common by Austrian analysts such as Haberler and by advocates of the real-bills doctrine such as Henry Parker Willis. On this, see Laidler 1999, 214-17 . Currie and his coauthors of the following memorandum clearly blamed it on the contraction of the money supply, which began in a mild way in 1928 but quickly gathered momentum after October 1929, an interpretation already developed by Currie (1931). his associates. Even so, as the 1930s progressed, those younger members of the department whose macroeconomic views were hostile to the New Deal won promotion and stayed, while those who, like the authors of the memorandum, took the more radical and intellectually coherent position it epitomizes, either left or were eased out. By 1936, therefore, when "Keynes came to America" with a new crop of graduate students who had studied with him at Cambridge and then migrated to Harvard, the department was perhaps a less interesting and lively place than it had been only a few years earlier. 13 The Harvard memorandum may be read, then, as giving some indication of the character and quality of an alternative intellectual tradition that might have developed at Harvard in the 1930s, had the department's promotion and tenure policies been different. And in the background here perhaps there stands the shade of Young, who had advocated activist monetary and fiscal stabilization policies during the 1920s, and had also, incidentally, written extensively on the monetary problems created by the international indebtedness left over from World War I and the Versailles Peace Conference, which he had attended as a senior adviser to the American delegation. 14
Currie's Economics
Currie was among those eased out of Harvard. As we have already noted, he was, along with White, a founding member of Jacob Viner's Freshman Brains Trust in Washington. This appointment, which began in June 1934, was supposed to be for a matter of months, and when he was invited to extend it into the autumn of that year, Harvard refused to grant him further leave, in effect forcing his resignation (see Sandilands 1990, 56-57) .
By his own account, Currie (1978) had been in difficulty with some of his senior colleagues for advocating unbalanced budgets as a means of fighting the depression long before 1934. Though no one, to the best of our knowledge, has ever questioned this particular claim, it does at first 13. Colander and Landreth 1996 contains a series of conversations with some of the economists involved in this later episode.
14. We nevertheless hesitate to enroll Young as a posthumous supporter of Currie and his colleagues in every aspect of their recommendations. During his life, Young attached great importance to the gold standard, and may well have hesitated to support wholeheartedly measures that might have put U.S. adherence to it at risk. But that his work profoundly influenced Currie is beyond question. sight sit oddly with the so-far available published record of his work at Harvard, which deals solely with monetary policy. 15 At the very least, it leaves open the question of how his analysis of fiscal policy at that time might have fitted in with his work on monetary questions. One commentator, Tavlas (1997, 170) , has gone so far as to suggest, largely on the basis of Currie's (1978) own retrospective account, that his policy stance rested on a belief in "the inefficacy of open market operations and the need for budget deficits." The following memorandum clarifies all of this. It first of all confirms the evidence of his other writings of the time that, contrary to Tavlas, Currie did indeed strongly and systematically advocate open-market operations as an important policy measure in their own right. Even more striking, although written before the events of 1932, it also discusses in some detail the likelihood that the commercial banks' first response to open-market operations would be to reduce their indebtedness to the Fed. Thus the stress that Currie laid on this same point in 1934, in his after-the-event discussion of the inefficacy of the open-market operations that were actually executed in 1932, was in no way an ex post rationalization.
Nevertheless, Currie and his associates were unduly optimistic on two matters. They underestimated the chances that open-market operations would provoke a gold outflow, and they did not foresee the buildup of excess reserves in the banking system, which would do so much to inhibit the effectiveness of these operations, although they did appear to believe that neither of these problems would arise if their recommendations were implemented in full. 16 Most striking of all, however, this 15. Indeed, an unpublished December 1934 memorandum to Marriner Eccles titled "Confidence" is the earliest substantive item dealing with expansionary fiscal policy to appear in Sandilands's 1990 bibliography of Currie's work. In his January 1931 Ph.D. dissertation, however, Currie did explore the links between monetary policy and the incentive to expand public works. Furthermore: "In so far as the policy of expanding public works in times of depression is adopted, and banks purchase bonds of public authorities, the additional bank credit will be spent directly and will not involve any decrease in the spending ability of private individuals" (Currie 1931, 236) .
16. Although Currie largely anticipated Friedman and Schwartz's (1963) explanation of the Great Contraction itself, his interpretation of the later years of the depression differs markedly from theirs, particularly over the matter of the buildup of excess reserves after 1934. Currie came to regard this buildup as a sign that, whatever it might have accomplished up until the end of 1932, orthodox monetary policy alone was not likely to be effective in bringing about expansion unaided as the depression continued (see Laidler 1999, 243-44 , for further discussion). Friedman and Schwartz on the other hand treat this same phenomenon as a result of an increase in the liquidity preferences of a badly shocked banking system. Currie was among those who recommended the increase of reserve requirements in 1936-37, which, in Friedman memorandum shows that, as early as January 1932, Currie and his associates had concluded that the economic situation was sufficiently serious that open-market operations alone might not be enough to deal with it: hence their advocacy of fiscal expansion. They were well aware of the potential for what we would now call "crowding out" effects to mute the influence of fiscal expansion, however, and argued the necessity of financing budget imbalances with money creation, particularly in the early stages of any such program.
Here it is worth drawing attention to a certain similarity between their views and those of Hawtrey, whose assistant Currie had recently been. Hawtrey is rightly regarded as the originator of the "Treasury view" that fiscal policy not financed by money creation would usually be fully crowded out, and that, when deficits were financed by money creation, it was this money creation, and not any direct expenditure associated with fiscal policy, that would do the work. The memorandum comes close to this position in raising the possibility of fiscal policy's effects being crowded out if it is financed by bond issues. It should also be recalled, however, that Hawtrey (1925, 41-42) discussed possible exceptions to his basic position. In particular, he allowed that an increase of confidence among the general public in an initially depressed economy could create a rise in velocity and prevent the government expenditures from having any crowding out effect on output; and he also argued that this would only be possible if such expenditures were initially accompanied by money creation so as to permit a confidence-building expansion to get under way in the first place. 17 It is, furthermore, worth recalling that and Schwartz's (1963, 520-34) view, provoked a subsequent downturn in the money supply and recession in 1937-38. Currie attributed this recession to an inadvertent tightening of fiscal policy in that year. See Sandilands 1990, 87-92 . Note finally that the claim here is not that Currie was in any general way a precursor or early exponent of Friedman's so-called monetarism. It is only that in one important respect, namely the analysis of the Great Contraction of 1929, Currie's work anticipated Friedman's later findings, as Friedman has himself acknowledged. See Laidler 1993 , 1077 -78 n. 12. 17. See Laidler 1999 , for further discussion of Hawtrey's treatment of this and related matters. It is interesting to note that, on the second page of the memorandum, there is a reference to "recommendations recently made by Dr. [Warren] Persons." Although we have not been able to track this reference down to a precise source, Robert S. Herren (1997, 523) remarks that "as the depression deepened, Persons became actively involved in attempts to promote economic recovery. His proposals included monetary expansion, increased taxes, eliminating price-fixing policies, and retaining the gold standard. Although over fifty prominent economists and statisticians endorsed his program in 1932, Persons' ideas did not alter U.S. economic policy."
Currie's later expositions of the case for expansionary fiscal policy invariably paid more attention to the interaction of such measures with the quantity and velocity of money than did more explicitly Keynesian treatments of the topic. 18 Evidently, these later expositions rested on principles that he and his colleagues had begun to develop while at Harvard in the early 1930s, and owed nothing to any later influence emanating from Keynes's General Theory; but they may have owed something to Hawtrey's analysis of exceptions to his own central position. 19
The Harris Foundation Recommendations
Finally we turn to the extremely strong similarities between the Harvard memorandum and the recommendations to President Hoover that emerged from the Harris Foundation conference of January 1932. These recommendations (along with Jacob Viner's contribution to the conference that produced them) are the earliest of the sources cited by Milton Friedman (1974, 162-68) as epitomizing the economics of the Chicago tradition of the 1930s, from which, he claimed, his own work ultimately drew its inspiration. Quoting J. Ronnie Davis (1968, 476) , Friedman (1974, 163) called attention to Chicago economists' advocacy of (in Davis's words) "large and continuous budget deficits to combat the mass unemployment and deflation of the times," and he went on to remark, now quoting from one of the recommendations (Wright 1932, 162) , that they recommended also "that the Federal Reserve banks systematically pursue open-market operations with the double aim of facilitating necessary government financing and increasing the liquidity of the banking structure." (163) Friedman contrasted the "hopeful and 'relevant' view" epitomized by these passages with the London School (really Austrian) view that I referred to in my " Restatement" [1956] when I spoke of "the atrophied and rigid caricature 18. On this matter, see Currie 1978 and Sandilands 1990, 68-78. 19 . And to Keynes's own earlier writings. He is quoted explicitly in the memorandum in a passage about "the bogy of inflation" that Daniele Besomi has identified as coming from Can Lloyd George Do It? (Keynes and Henderson 1929, 118) .
[of the quantity theory] that is so frequently described by the proponents of the new income-expenditure approach." (163) Now Friedman was careful to note that the recommendations bore the signatures of twelve non-Chicago economists in addition to twelve from that university, and he did not therefore claim that "this more hopeful and 'relevant' view" of what could be done about the depression "was restricted to Chicago" (1974, . 20 But a comparison of the Harris Foundation recommendations with the following memorandum, completed, it should be recalled, earlier in the same month, forces us to conclude that, at this early stage in the development of the Chicago tradition, there was nothing at all unique about them. 21 The recommendations urged President Hoover to support vigorous open-market operations and public works programs (paras. 2-4); so did the Currie, Ellsworth, and White memorandum, although the latter was more enthusiastic about the second of these measures. The recommendations urged that the Federal Reserve System be empowered to issue notes against government securities, thus effectively increasing the amount of "free gold" available to the system (para. 1); so did the memorandum. Finally, they urged that attention be given to reducing or canceling intergovernmental debts, and to beginning international negotiations with 21. If, however, we follow Don Patinkin (1969) and George Tavlas (1997 Tavlas ( , 1998a Tavlas ( , 1998b , and focus on advocacy of public works policies as a means of injecting money into circulation as a key characteristic of Chicago thinking, then it should be noted that a brief reference to this position occurs in Jacob Viner's contribution to the informal discussions that took place at the Harris Foundation conference, during the session of 29 January titled "What Should Be Done in the Present Emergency." He argued that earlier experience with public works expenditures was irrelevant to the current situation because, among other things, "none [were] connected with a program of expansion of currency or banking funds" (Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation 1932, 245) . Steindl (1995, 84-85) also quotes this passage, but cites Viner 1933 as the principal source for his advocacy of this typical Chicago position. Laidler (1999, 237-39) also dates its emergence from 1933, and now notes that an explicit reference to Viner 1933 was inadvertently omitted from or edited out of this passage. a view to securing a substantial reduction in tariffs and other trade barriers (paras. 5-6); so, once again, did the memorandum. The similarities between the two documents are so great that we find it hard to believe that they are coincidental. 22 Moreover, there is a direct connection between these two documents, in the person of John H. Williams. He was beyond doubt familiar with Currie's earlier work, having supervised his thesis, and he not only signed the Harris recommendations, but also had a hand in drafting them sufficiently important to have been chosen by his colleagues to prepare an essay for the Harris conference volume putting them in context (Williams 1932) .
That essay, it must be said, makes no explicit reference to Currie, Ellsworth, and White, nor did Williams refer directly to them or their memorandum in his extensive contributions to the oral deliberations of the conference. Moreover, his essay has nothing to say about fiscal policy, despite the fact that one of the recommendations it was justifying was that "the federal government maintain its program of public works and public services at a level not lower than that of 1931-32." However, Williams's (1932, 157) conclusions-that "the greatest single help, internally, would be a vigorous open-market policy designed to reduce rediscounts of member banks and to increase the supply of purchasing power" and that "the greatest help of international character would be the substantial reduction, or cancellation, of war debts, and the scaling down of tariff barriers"-echo not only the other recommendations emanating from the conference, but also, as we have already seen, proposals set out in great detail in the memorandum. Furthermore, the transcript of the oral deliberations of the Harris Foundation conference shows that 22. It must be recalled that, contrary to later myths surrounding the so-called Keynesian revolution, support for vigorous open-market operations was no novelty at this time-e.g., Keynes (1931) , Hawtrey (1932) -nor was advocacy of expansionary fiscal policy-e.g., Pigou (1927) , Robertson (1928) , Douglas and Director (1931) . However, all of the last four justmentioned advocates of expansionary fiscal policy based their support on a belief that monetary policy measures, including open-market operations, were too weak to engender recovery. Thus, the main claim to originality of the Currie, Ellsworth, and White memorandum and the Harris conference recommendations is that they both, and particularly the first, canvassed the joint and consciously coordinated use of monetary and fiscal measures at a very early stage of the depression. In this connection it might be noted that Tavlas (1977 Tavlas ( , 1997 Tavlas ( , 1998a Tavlas ( , 1998b has long taken the view that Douglas is a key figure in the Chicago tradition, and that his 1931 book, written with his then research assistant Aaron Director, is one of its important documents. In our view, this book's pessimism about the effectiveness of expansionary monetary policy puts it outside that tradition as it is usually understood. Douglas's earlier and later espousal of underconsumptionism also seems to separate him from an intellectual tradition based on the quantity theory. See Laidler 1999, 206-11, 222-28, and Steindl 1995, 93-94 , for further discussions.
Williams stressed the importance of existing commercial bank indebtedness to the Federal Reserve System as a factor affecting the likely efficacy of open-market operations, just as the memorandum does, and he also gave a quantitative assessment of the scale of open-market operations needed to influence the economy that ran exactly parallel to a similar discussion in the memorandum. Where Currie, Ellsworth, and White wrote At the moment of writing the indebtedness [of commercial banks to the Fed] amounts to over $800,000,000. We strongly recommend, therefore, that the reserve banks purchase upwards of a billion dollars of bills and securities. This action would satisfy member banks' desire for liquidity and in addition give them large surplus reserves,
Williams remarked
If we examine our situation today we would find that it would take something like double the present security holdings of the Federal Reserve banks merely to get the banking system out of debt. Apparently the first desire of the banking system would be to clear itself from debt, so that I can express my point . . . quantitatively by saying that it would take, for example, $1,600,000,000 of Federal Reserve assets merely to get ready to get started to pump money into circulation.
If he had not actually read the memorandum, then, Williams demonstrably held essentially identical views to those of its authors about the scale of open-market operations needed at the beginning of 1932. 23 An 23. The reader's attention is drawn to the fact that Williams here estimates the total amount of Federal Reserve assets needed to establish conditions for the further pursuit of expansionary policy, while Currie, Ellsworth, and White estimate the amount by which such assets need to be increased if monetary policy is to exercise an expansionary effect. According to Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 347-48) , the open-market purchase program of 1932, which lasted from April till July of that year, resulted in the system's acquiring roughly one billion dollars worth of government securities. About half a billion of this increase was offset by an outflow of gold, but a reversal of gold movements thereafter saw gold holdings increase slightly over the year as a whole. However, discounts and bills bought (mainly the former) fell by half a billion between July 1932 and January 1933. Overall, the operation was sufficiently strong to keep the stock of high-powered money expanding slowly during 1932 and to stabilize the growth rate of the money supply in the second half of the year. Note that Currie, Ellsworth, and White, who were optimistic that member banks "out of debt and in possession of surplus reserves could be . . . relied upon to bring about an expansion of deposits," did not foresee the growth in the ratio of reserves to deposits that would continue throughout 1932. But this was partly because opinion on a critical question of monetary policy, with roots in discussions then going on at Harvard, was thus clearly represented at the Harris Foundation conference by one of the principal authors of its recommendations. It is hard to believe, as we have already remarked, that these two documents are totally independent of one another.
Conclusions
To summarize then: the following memorandum is interesting from a number of points of view. It provides concrete evidence that, whatever it may have been like later in the decade, in 1931-32 the Harvard economics department was the scene of vigorous and constructive discussion of the depression and how to deal with it, with an optimistic activist viewpoint well represented. Lauchlin Currie's role here has long been recognized, and this memorandum throws important new light on it, showing clearly that he was not a lone wolf at Harvard. More important, it provides a unique source of evidence on just how far his views on the use of fiscal policy had developed while he was still at Harvard, and how they fitted together with his, by now well known, monetary interpretation of the causes of the depression. Finally, the similarities between this memorandum's contents and those of the famous Harris Foundation recommendations of 31 January 1932 provide conclusive evidence that many of the ideas that characterize the pre-General Theory "Chicago tradition" in monetary economics, of which so much has been written in the last twenty-five years, were also current at Harvard at the time when that tradition was developing. For all these reasons, then, the following memorandum is an important document.
